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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J O S E P H M. Q U A G L I A N A and
P A U L A L. Q U A G L I A N A ,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, l
vs

\ Case No.
E X Q U I S I T E H O M E B U I L D E R S , / 13723
INC., and A L L A N K R U C K E N B E R G , G A R Y M A R G E T T S , dba
K M DESIGN,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
This is an action by property owners against a
building contractor and designers for breaches of contract, with counterclaims that the property owners had
breached the contracts.

DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
This action was tried to court without a jury. I t
dismissed the property owners' action and entered judg-
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ment for the contractor in the amount of $1,577.73, together with attorney's fees of $1,182.00; and in favor
of the designers for $500.00; plus interest and costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and remand to the district court with direction to dismiss the
counterclaims of the defendants and enter judgment
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Exquisite
Home Builders, Inc., in the amount of $4,303.72, together with an attorney's fee of $2,257.00, interest and
costs; or to make findings with respect to the damages
and attorney's fees to which appellants are entitled; or
to grant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I n the spring of 1971, Dr. and Mrs. Quagliana
(plaintiffs and appellants) wanted to have a home
built in Salt Lake City, utilizing plans previously used
by Mrs. Quagliana's father (It. 164). Some changes
were desired in the plans that they had, and they contacted defendant K M Design (It. 1965), a partnership
engaged in designing homes and apartments (It. 332).
The partners in K M Design are defendants Gary
Margetts and Allan Kruckenberg (It. 142, 126).
An oral agreement was entered into by the Quaglianas and K M Design under which K M agreed to
prepare modified plans and specifications (It. 334).
2
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to the other terms
of the contract, but the court found that the Quaglianas
were to pay $1,000.00 for preparation of the plans and
specifications, and that K M did not agree to supervise
construction (R. 11, 65).
During the conversations with Gary Margetts of
K M , the Quaglianas made it clear that they wanted
a home in the Oak Hills area, with a view of the city
from the rear window (R. 168, 346). A t that time
they did not own a building lot, and began looking for
one upon which the house would fit and provide the
desired view (R. 168).
During the Quaglianas' meetings with Margetts,
he recommended some general contractors to build the
home, among whom was defendant Exquisite Home
Builders, Inc. (R. 167).
The Quaglianas contacted Philip Marstella, an
employee and representative of Exquisite Home Builders (R. 167). Marstella was also a real estate broker
and showed the Quaglianas property he thought might
be suitable for the home (R. 279). Dr. Quagliana himself drove through the Oak Hills area and spotted a
potential lot on Sherwood Drive (R. 168). At his request Marstella and Margetts went to look at the lot,
and both advised him that the lot was suitable, and that
the home would fit on the lot properly (R. 168, 346).
Margetts said there would be a view (R. 346). The
Quaglianas thereupon negotiated for and purchased
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the lot (R. 170). K M prepared a plot plan showing
the location of the house on the lot (R. 170, 346).
On or about October 7, 1971, a building contract
was entered into by Marstella as agent for Exquisite
Homes, and by the Quaglianas (Ex. 2-P). The contract contained the following provisions material to the
issues in this case:
1. S C O P E O F W O R K : Contractor agrees
to provide all the labor and materials and do all
things necessary for the proper construction and
completion of the dwelling house and the other
improvements for the Owner upon the building
site above described in strict accordance with this
contract, the plans of specifications hereunto attached and made a part hereof and identified by
the signature of the parties hereto and in strict
compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances
and other governmental regulations affecting
such construction.
4. T I M E O F C O M P L E T I O N : The contractor agrees the work hereunder shall commence within 10 days after the notice that the
mortgage covering the building site, given by
the Owner to the Lender, has been recorded, and
funds equal to the contract price have been deposited with the Lender in Construction Trust
Fund Account No
as provided in Section
3 hereof, time being of the essence, and contractor agrees to complete the construction of
the dwelling house and improvements according
to the plans and specifications, all applicable
laws, ordinances and other government regula-
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tions applicable thereto, as well as in a manner
satisfactory to the Owner and the Lender, within 180 days from the date of commencement.
#

#

#

8. P E R M I T S A N D S U R V E Y S : * * *
Contractor shall, at his own cost and expense,
provide the building permit. All other permits
necessary for the construction of said dwelling
house and improvements, including permits for
sewer, water and other public utility connections
shall be paid by the * * * Contractor.
The cost of the original inspections and surveys for the staking of the foundation shall be
borne and paid by the Contractor.
The cost of re-inspections as required shall be
paid by the Contractor.
The location of the building and improvements upon the above-described building site
shall be made by the Contractor, and in making
said location, he shall comply with all zoning
ordinances and regulations and all building restrictions and protective covenants governing
said real property,
*

*

*

17. LENDER'S COURTESY SERVICE:
As a matter of courtesy and favor, the Lender
has supplied the Owner and Contractor with this
suggested form of agreement. The parties hereto declare that it was entirely optional with them
to use said form and that they voluntarily adopted and completed same. * * * (Emphasis
added).
5
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The contract was on a form provided by Prudential. Marstella had used the form previously and was
familiar with is contents (R. 297).
Building restrictions had been recorded for the
subdivision in which the property was located (Ex. 10P ) . They included the following provisions:
9. S E T B A C K S : No dwelling house or other
structure to be constructed or situated on any of
said lots created except in conformity with the
"set back" lines as established in each instance
by the Architectural Supervising Committee and
in conformity with any additional "set back"
lines which may be fixed by the undersigned, its
successors and assigns, in contract or deeds to
any or all of the lots created on said property.
* * *

14. I M P R O V E M E N T S :

(b) Before the Architectural Supervising
Committee may approve any plans for construction work of any kind on the premises, the lot
owner or purchaser must submit the said committee an accurate plot plan showing the exact
location of all buildings to be built on the lot.
No construction of any kind or nature on any
of the lots shall be commenced until either sidewalk or curb grade has been established.
(c) A P P R O V A L O F P L A N S : No structures * * * shall be constructed upon any of the
6
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said lots without the written approval as to location, height and design thereof first having been
obtained from the Architectural Supervising
Committee. Before construction work of any
kind is started, the plans of the exterior design
of any building to be constructed on any of the
said lots shall first be submitted to the Architectural Supervising Committee for their approval,
and said plans shall show the four exterior elevations of said building, together with the floor
plan plotted on a map of said lot and any additional details of the house construction the Architectural Supervising Committee may require.
•* # #

The set back established for the Quaglianas' Sherwood Drive property was 30 feet (R. 241).
After the contract had been entered into, Marstella went to Salt Lake City for a building permit
(R. 258), and submitted the plans and specifications
and plot plan. The plot plan showed a 30-foot set back
on one street and a 20-foot set back on Sherwood Drive
(R. 282). Before issuing the building permit, the city's
representative struck out the words "20 feet" and inserted the word "average", meaning the average set
back for houses located on the same side of Sherwood
Drive. The average set back for such houses was 30
feet (R. 214-215, 298, 228).
^
Exquisite thereupon hired an engineering company to stake out lines for the excavation for the home.
Marstella made no effort to determine the average set
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back and directed the engineer to stake the lines exactly as shown on the original plot plan (R. 282, 300).
Exquisite proceeded to excavate the lines staked by
the engineering company.
At about the time the excavation was completed,
Dr. Quagliana visited the property and discovered that
the home was so located that there would be no view
of the valley (R. 172). Marstella testified that it was
fairly obvious at that time that the home would face
directly onto the back of the other house, and "would
look up into the front hill on the northeast part of the
valley" (R. 283).
Marstella and Dr. Quagliana agreed that the house
could be rotated at an angle so that it would face the
valley (R. 172). I t was Dr. Quagliana's desire to shift
the house as far as possible and still meet the required
side yard and rear yard set backs, Marstella said (R.
283). The set back in the front yard (Sherwood Drive)
was not lessened, but was increased except for the
corner, which was the axis for the rotation (R. 284,
299).
Marstella then had a new plot plan prepared in
which the house had been shifted to provide the view
that the Quaglianas had wanted in the first place (R.
284). The new plot plan, like the old one, showed a
set back of 20 feet on Sherwood Drive; again the city
changed it to "average" (R. 314); and again Marstella
told his engineers to stake the excavation with a 20-foot

S
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

set back (R. 315). No effort was made to determine
what the average set back was (R. 315). The footings
and foundations were placed with a 20-foot set back on
Sherwood Drive instead of the 30-foot set back required by the city regulations and the notation on the
plot plan by the city.
Dr. Quagliana was informed that the plans and
specifications had not been submitted to the Architectural Supervising Committee for the subdivision, and
he told Marstella approval should be obtained (R. 175176). There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether
this conversation was before or after the concrete was
poured, but it is clear that it was at about that time.
The concrete was poured on December 7 (R. 301), and
sometime prior to December 10 Marstella had left the
plans and specifications with the committee with a note
asking that they be approved (Ex. 11-P). On December 10, the committee wrote a letter to Marstella (Ex.
12-P) which contained the following:
We note that you only have a 20-foot set back
to the garage from the front property line. Our
minimum is 30 feet. You show a 4/12 pitch roof
which must be lowered to 3 ^ / 1 2 pitch.
A t about the same time, the exact date is not clear,
the city inspectors placed a''"stop order" on the construction (R. 217, 259). The court found that there
was insufficient evidence to show the reason for the
stop order (R. 19), but it is clear from the evidence
that the building did not, in fact, conform to the set
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back requirements. Harry Hurley, Zoning Enforcement Officer for Salt Lake City, testified that the set
back was 10 feet short of that required by the average
of houses in the block, and that notices were given to
the contractor and the owner (R. 216).
Exquisite stopped construction work about the
time of receipt of the letter from the Architectural Supervising Committee and the stop order from Salt Lake
City, and no further construction was done on the
home (R. 260).
Dr. Quagliana met with Glade Southam, president of Exquisite, and Marstella concerning what
might be done. Dr. Quagliana said he would go to the
Architectural Supervising Committee to see if it would
be possible to work out a solution with them (R. 317).
Thereafter, Dr. Quagliana did meet with the committee, but was unable to obtain any relief. H e was told
the only thing that could be done was to start over and
try and meet requirements (R. 363). Mr. Muhlestein,
a member of the committee, testified that the committee would not approve a set back of less than 30 feet
(R. 243). Committee approval was never obtained
(R. 261).
On January 3, 1972, Dr. Quagliana called Prudential Federal Savings and told them not to disburse
any more funds to Exquisite without his approval (R.
189). Negotiations commenced between Dr. Quagliana
and Exquisite on January 4, 1972, concerning what
might be done to remedy the situation (R. 178, 304,
10
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317), but no settlement was reached. Time went by,
without any further construction work being done, and
on March 9, 1972, Dr. Quagliana's counsel wrote to
Exquisite terminating the company's right to proceed
further with construction and telling them that the
Quaglianas would look to them for damages for breach
of contract (Ex. 16-DE).
I n December, 1972, the Quaglianas sold the lot on
Sherwood Drive (R. 183), having theretofore purchased a new home at another location (R. 182). An
effort had been made to sell the home over many months
and Dr. Quagliana had incurred expenses in selling it
(R. 183, 264). H e ultimately was able to sell it to a
contractor for speculation for the sum of $23,750.00
(R. 264).
The court concluded that Dr. Quagliana had
breached his contract by refusing to let Exquisite Home
Builders proceed further with construction and that
Exquisite Home Builders was entitled to recover their
unreimbursed costs. I t also found that Dr. Quagliana's
agreement with K M was to pay $1,000.00 for the
plans and specifications, that only $500.00 had been
paid, and that therefore K M was entitled to recover
the balance of $500.00 from Quaglianas.
ARGUMENT
1

'

The court should have found that the foundations
and footings placed by Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.,
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violated the set back provisions of the Salt Lake City
zoning ordinance and the restrictive covenants of the
subdivision.
Although requested to make a finding with respect
to violation of the set back provisions of the ordinances
and the building restrictions (R. 43) the court refused.
This was a material issue in the case. Paragraph 4 of
the complaint (R. 141) avers that the defendant E x quisite Home Builders "excavated for and poured the
foundation of the home in such a location on the plaintiffs' property that it would not comply with the building restrictions on the property."
I t is the duty of a trial court to make the findings
of fact with respect to all of the contested issues in a
case. See Thomas v. Forrell, 82 Uah 535, 26 P.2d 328
(1933) ; Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
76 Am. Jur. 2d, TnaZ,§1259.
I t is not necessary to send the case back to the trial]
court for a finding on this issue, however, because the
facts with respect to violation of the set back restrictions
were not seriously contested.
Mr. Harry Hurley, the Zoning Enforcement Officer for Salt Lake City, testified (and was corroborated by the testimony of Marstella) that when the plot
plan was submitted the 20-foot set back was stricken
and the word "average" was written in. The set back
as actually established by Exquisite Homes was 20
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feet, while the average set back for homes in that block
was 30 feet.
Mr. Grant Muhlestein, a member of the architectural committee for St. Mary's Hills, Plat E , testified
that the average set back, north side of Sherwood Drive,
where the lot was located, was 30 feet, and that a 30foot set back was required by the committee. H e stated
that the committee could not and would not have approved a 20-foot set back.
Thus, the evidence required a finding that the
foundation as built by Exquisite Home Builders was
in violation of the zoning ordinances, the building permit as approved by Salt Lake City, and the restrictive
covenants that had been recorded for the subdivision.
II
Other findings of fact made by the court are not
supported by the evidence.
The court's Finding No. 17 was that Dr. Quagliana had instructed Marstella to rotate the home and
where to put it. Dr. Quagliana testified that he talked
to Marstella about the problem and it was agreed between them that the house could be shifted to obtain a
better view of the valley. Marstella testified that Dr.
Quagliana did not expressly approve of the new plot
plan, but after looking at it said it was better (R. 285).
H e also testified that he was "instructed" to shift the
13
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house as far as he could and still meet the side yard
and rear yard requirements (It. 283). H e said the new
drawing did not show the set back because it was
greater than on the first drawing.
The court found that Dr. Quagliana inspected the
job site after re-staking and approved of the re-staking
(Finding No. 23). The testimony of Mr. Marstella
with respect to that matter was as follows (It. 284):
Q : Did Dr. Quagliana inspect the staking prior
to any excavation?
A : I wouldn't say for sure whether he did.
The court's Finding No. 31 is to the effect that
Southam made various offers to the Quaglianas with
respect to tearing out the foundations and footing,
starting construction anew, buying the lot, and moving
the garage to the opposite side of the house. The testimony indicates that there was no firm offer made. Marstella testified that no firm proposal had been made and
that the conversation was to talk about possible solutions to the problem in which Exquisite Homes found
itself (It. 304).
Southam testified that he felt it would be better
to purchase the property and continue to build the house
on its own account and that the company was trying
to escape with the least possible cost (It. 322).
The court's Finding No. 33 was improper, although supported by some evidence. I n the Quaglianas'
14
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rebuttal case counsel offered evidence with respect to
the conversations that occurred after the meeting of
January 4, 1972, in an effort to show that no firm proposal had been made. The following occurred in the
examination of Dr. Quagliana (R. 364-365):
Q : Can you tell us what, if any, contact you had
with either Mr. Marstella or Mr. Southam subsequent to January 4 ?
A : Yes.
MR. S A W A Y A : Excuse me, your honor.
That is all matters which were part of the plaintiff's case in chief. I don't see that we really
ought to have to listen to it again.
T H E C O U R T : Well, what are you seeking
to rebut here, Mr. Roe?
MR. R O E : Well, there was a good deal of
testimony, if the court please, about what kind
of negotiations went on and what kind of commitments were made in this case by Dr. Quagliana and by me after the meeting of January 4.
T H E C O U R T : I really don't see what relevancy the negotiations after the work was stopped have with this lawsuit. I mean, they had a
problem. I t wasn't solved. And what their intentions were, their hopes were or their efforts
to resolve it afterwards, do not impress me as
being material or helpful here, because I can't
see that the fact that they have negotiated in
good faith or bad faith afterwards to try and
correct the problem gives us any help with respect to how we should resolve this question.
15
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MR. R O E : All right, I won't pursue it in
that case, then.
Notwithstanding the court's declaration that evidence with respect to negotiations after January 4,
1972, were not material to the issues in the case, it
made a finding with respect to those matters when it
found that Exquisite Home Builders after February
23 advised plaintiff's counsel they were willing to tear
out the foundation and start anew.
Ill
Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., materially breached its contract when it located the home in such a manner that it did not comply with the zoning ordinances
or the restrictive covenants for the subdivision.
I n reaching its decision, the trial court reasoned
that it was the obligation of plaintiff, rather than E x quisite Home Builders, to obtain the initial approval
from the Architectural Supervising Committee, that
the approval was not obtained, that because of the
failure to obtain it, the the committee sent the letter of
December 10, 1972, proclaiming the violation, and that
construction was stopped because of the letter.
I n so doing, the court ignored the terms of the
contract, and lost sight of the breach claimed and proved
by the Quaglianas.
I t was not the failure to obtain approval that con16
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stituted the breach, but the building of the home in violaion of the zoning ordinance and restrictive covenants.
The contract required that the home be completed "in
strict compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances
and other governmental regulations affecting such construction." I t also required the contractor to locate
the building on the lot and "in making said location,
[to] comply with all zoning ordinances and regulations
and al building restrictions and protective covenants
governing said real property."
The contract also provided that the contractor was
to perform the work "in strict accordance" with the
contract and the plans and specifications, but the provisions are not conflicting. The plans as approved by
Salt Lake City did, in fact, provide for an "average"
set back, and the permit issued by Salt Lake City provided for an "average" set back, not a 20-foot set back.
Moreover, a reasonable construction of the contract
is that the plans and specifications are to be followed,
but in those instances in which they conflict with the
requirements of law, ordinances, or restrictive covenants, adjustment must be made. This is particularly
true with respect to location of the house, the responsibility for which is expressly placed upon the contractor.
Any other construction would nullify parts of the
contract and make it invalid.
I t is fundamental that in interpreting contracts
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the courts must, if possible, give effect to all provisions
of the contract. See Restatement of Contracts, §235 ( c ) :
A writing is interpreted as a whole and all
writings forming part of the same transaction
are interpreted together.
And 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §259:
I t is a fundamental rule of contract construction that the entire contract, and each and all of
its parts and provisions, must be given meaning,
and force and effect, if that can consistently and
reasonably be done. An interpretation which
gives reasonable meaning to all its provisions will
be preferred to one which leaves a portion of the
writing useless or inexplicable. So far as reasonably possible, effect will be given to all the language and to every word, expression, phrase and
clause of the agreement. No word or clause
should be rejected as mere surplusage if the
court can discover any reasonable purpose thereof which can be gathered from the whole instrument. A construction will not be given to one
part of a contract which will annul another part,
unless such a result is fairly inescapable.
I n McKay v. Barnett, 21 Utah 239, 60 Pac. 1100
(1900) this court said:
In construing the contract, each of its provisions must be considered in connection with
the others, and, if possible, effect must be given
to all. A construction which entirely neutralizes
one provision should not be adopted if the contract is susceptible of another, which gives effect
to all of its provisions.
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It is also a generally accepted principle that an
interpretation should be adopted which gives a lawful
meaning to the contract, rather than an unlawful one.
The rule as stated in Restatement
§236(a), is as follows:

of

Contracts,

An interpretation which gives a reasonable,
lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part of such manifestations
unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.
The same rule is announced in somewhat different
terms in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §254:
It is a general principle that where a contract
is fairly open to two constructions, by one of
which it would be lawful and the other unlawful,
the former will be adopted. Thus, if a contract
is capable of a construction which will make it
valid, legal, effective, and enforceable, it will be
given that construction if the contract is ambiguous or uncertain. A construction which renders the contract valid is preferred to one which
renders it invalid, and it will not be construed so
as to be invalid unless that construction is required by the terms of the agreement in the light
of the surrounding circumstances.
The rule was adopted by this court in Schofield v.
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281,
39 P.2d 342 (1934), in which the court said :
It is elemental, in construing a contract, that
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its purpose, its nature, and subject matter
should be considered. A construction giving an
instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can reasonably be
done, and between two possible constructions
that will be adopted which establishes a valid
contract.
It is not necessary to go beyond the plain language
of the contract to see that Exquisite Home Builders
had a legal duty to see that the horrte was located in
such a manner that it did not conflict with zoning regulations or restrictive covenants. The set back requirements for both the city zoning regulations and the restrictive covenants was the "average" set back of the
other buildings on Sherwood Drive, on the same side
of the street, and in the block in which the Quagliana
home was being built. The average set back in the area
was 30 feet, but the foundation was placed with a 20foot set back. This is a substantial and material breach
of the contract.
The fact that a Salt Lake City inspector had approved the footings does not change the legal obligations of Exquisite Home Builders under the contract.
The contract was to comply with the regulations, not
merely to obtain approval of an inspector. A similar
question has been presented in connection with contracts
requiring construction in compliance with Federal
Housing Administration or Veterans Administration
Housing standards. I t is consistently held that mere
approval by an inspector does not control the question
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of whether the structure meets the contract requirements. See Annotation, "Construction of clause in
building contract that structure will comply with regulations, plans, or standards of the Federal Housing
Administration or the Veterans Administration," 67
A.L.R.2d 1017 (1959). There the annotator says:
Generally, a clause in a building contract that
the structure will comply with the regulations,
plans, or standards of the Federal Housing Administration or Veterans Administration has
been construed to mean that the structure, when
completed, will conform to such regulations, etc.,
and not that the approval of the structure by
those agencies is conclusive on the question of
compliance.
Moreover, the decision to rotate the house did not
affect the legal oblgiations of Exquisite Home Builders, either by way of a new agreement or by way of
waiver.
I t was known to all the parties, Exquisite Home
Builders, the Quaglianas, and K M Design, that before purchasing the lot on Sherwood Drive the Quaglianas were interested in a lot which would accommodate the particular house, and with a view of the valley.
When the foundation was first excavated, Dr. Quagliana visted the site and observed that the window faced
the mountain. Thereafter Dr. Quagliana and Marstella discussed the possibility of rotating the house on
its corner. Rotation was apparently discussed because
of the fact that this would have to be done in order to
21
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retain the original set back provision. There was no
discussion about the front set back for the reason that
it would not be affected. But Marstella himself testified that Dr. Quagliana was interested in shifting the
house as much as possible within the requirements for
side yard and rear yard set back requirements.
The method by which the problem was approached
contains no suggestion that Dr. Quagliana intended
to proceed with the house in contravention of the zoning
ordinances or the restrictive covenants. I t was legitimate for him to assume that Exquisite Home Builders
had properly established the front yard set back; and
it must be assumed that the parties intended to have
the remaining portions of the contract remain in effect.
As stated in 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Building and Construction Contracts^ §4:
When a building is in process of construction,
and additions or alterations are made, the original contract, unless it is so entirely abandoned
that it is impossible to trace it and say to what
part of the work it shall be applied, is held still
to exist, and to be binding on the parties so far
as it can be followed. The additions or alterations, if the expense of the work is thereby increased, may be the subject of a new contract,
either express or implied, but they do not affect
the original contract, which still remains in force.
See also 17 A, C.J.S., Contracts, §395.
In this case there is absolutely no evidence that the
parties intended to affect the provision that the building
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would be located in conformance with regulations and
covenants.
Neither is there any evidence showing an intention
on the part of the Quaglianas to waive the provision
requiring the contractor to properly locate the building. The case does not have the elements of waiver. In
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d
308 (1936), the court set out the elements as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. 27 R.C.L. 904. To constitute a
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit,
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly
made, although it may be express or implied.
See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and
§158.

Waiver,

Exquisite Home Builders was in default under the
contract as of December 7, 1971, when they located the
building contrary to the requirements of the zoning ordinance and the restrictive covenant. This being true,
the Quaglianas were discharged from any further performance under the contract and had a right to do what
they did on January 3, 1972, i.e., tell Prudential Federal Savings not to make any more payments to Exquisite Home Builders.
In Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P.2d
464, 469 (1962), the court said:
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* * * It has been said that the party who commits the first breach of contract cannot maintain
an action against the other for a subsequent
failure to perform. * * *
In Scientific Packages v. Gwinn, 13 Colo. 233, 301
P.2d 719 (1956), plaintiffs had sought to restrain defendants from competing with them on the basis of a
contract containing a non-competition agreement. The
contract also provided, however, that the defendant and
companies controlled by him, would be released from
all liability under certain promissory notes guaranteed
by him and another, and steps were to have been taken
within 10 days to cause the guaranty to be cancelled
and rescinded. At the time the action was brought, this
had not been done, and the court denied injunctive
relief to the plaintiff on the non-competition agreement. The court said:
W e must conclude that plaintiffs' failure to
release Gwinn from liability on the note held by
the bank in accordance with Shapiro's promise
was a substantial breach of the contract, which
deprived plaintiffs of the right to demand performance by Gwinn of the agreement not to operate a competing business. The party who commits the first substantial breach of a contract is
also depirived of the right to complain of a subsequent breach by the other party.
This is the general rule. See Restatement
tracts, §§274,379:

of Con-
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§274:
(1) I n promises for an agreed exchange, any
material failure of performance by one p a r t y
not justified by the conduct of the other discharges the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even though his promise is not in terms
conditional. A n immaterial failure does not operate as such discharge.
(2) The rule of subsection (1) is applicable
though the failure of performance is not a violation of legal duty.
§379:
A breach or non-performance of a promise by
one p a r t y to a bilateral contract, so material as
to justify a refusal of the other party to perform
a contractual duty, discharges that duty.
See also Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4
U t a h 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689, 693 (1956) ; and Fleming
v. Fleming-Felt
Co., 7 U t a h 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712, 716
(1958).
Exquisite H o m e Builders failed to locate the building in accordance with the contract; then it let a month
pass without doing anything about it before D r . Quagliana stopped payments under the contract. F u r t h e r
time passed, and while there were some settlement
negotiations with respect to attempts to correct the
problems created by Exquisite H o m e Builders, no settlement agreement was entered into, and the contractor
did nothing to go forward with the building of the
home. T h e Quaglianas were completely justified, there25
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fore, when they notified Exquisite Home Builders that
its right to proceed under the contract was terminated.
Time was of the essence of the contract. Exquisite
Home Builders had breached the contract on or before
December 7, 1971, and more than three months had
passed without any further construction work having
been done on the home. The original contract provided
for completion of the home within 180 days or by approximately April 7, 1972. Half of that period had
been spent doing nothing, and it was apparent that it
would be impossible to complete the home within the
time specified, or within any extension to which the
contractor might be entitled.
IV
KM Design materially breached its contract with
the Quaglianas.
All of the parties agreed that before the Quagliants purchased the lot on Sherwood Drive they wanted
to be sure that the house would fit on the lot and would
afford them a good view of the valley from the rear
window. Although there was no written contract between the Quaglianas and K M Design, the conduct
of the Quaglianas in having the plans and specifications drawn up, and in checking with the contractor
and the designer before the purchase of the lot, makes
it apparent that a material consideration of the Quaglianas in entering into the contract with K M Design
was to not just obtain some plans and specifications,

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

but to obtain plans and specifications compatible with
the lot they purchased and their desire for a view.
I t was with the advice and approval of K M Design and Exquisite Home Builders that the Quaglianas
purchased the Sherwood Drive lot. They were assured
by both that the house could properly be placed on the
lot. K M Design was well aware of the desire for a
view of the valley, and yet the plot plan prepared by
K M Design was prepared in such a manner that the
house did not face the valley. It faced the rear of other
houses, and the mountain.
Moreover, K M Design prepared a plot plan with
a 20-foot set back despite the fact that zoning and restrictive covenants required a 30-foot set back. After it
was determined that a 30-foot set back was required,
Exquisite Home Builders attempted by overlays and
plotting to determine whether the house could be built
on the lot. It determined that it was possible to build
the house on the lot, but not in such a manner that it
would afford a view of the valley to the Quaglianas. It
was testified to by Marstella that if the house were relocated with a 30-foot set back, the view of the valley
would be worse than it had been when Dr. Quagliana
first looked at the site after the original excavation
(R. 292).
Certainly the designer had some obligation with respect to the location of the home and carrying out the
desires of his client with respect to a view. It is ap-
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parent from the evidence that he did not fulfill that
obligation and did not fulfill the obligation to properly
locate the house on the property so that it would meet
the requirements of the zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants.
This being the case, K M Design first breached
the contract, and was not entitled to recover the portion of the purchase price they claim was unpaid.

V
The court erred in awarding to Exquisite Home
Builders the unreimbursed costs it had put into the
building.
As pointed out under Point I I I , above, a party in
default under a contract is not entitled to recover under
the terms of the contract. Under some circumstances
he is entitled to a remedy of restitution.
Restatement of Contracts, §357, provides:
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to
perform his contract and is justified therein by
the plaintiff's own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition, but the plaintiff has
rendered a part performance under the contract
that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff can get judgment except as stated in Subsecion (2), for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused to the defendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding
a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation,
if
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(a) The plaintiff's breach of non-preformance is not willful and deliberate; or
(b) The defendant, with knowledge that
the plaintiff's breach of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part
performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or
retains property received although its return
in space is still not unreasonably difficult or
injurious.

(3) The measure of the defendant's benefit
from the plaintiff's part performance is the
amount by which he has been enriched as a result of such performance unless the facts are
those stated in Subsection ( l b ) , in which case it
is the price fixed by the contract for such part
performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable
proportion of the total contract price.
(The parties referred to in the Restatement should
be reversed here, since we are dealing with the counterclaim and considering the right of a defendant to recover for its part performance.)
If the Exquisite has a right to any offset or recovery because of its part performance, it must be
under the provisions of paragraph (la) relating to a
non-willful or non-deliberate breach, in which case the
measure of recovery is the amount by which the Quaglianas were enriched as a result of such performance.
In order for a contractor to recover for the value
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of benefit conferred, he must show that a benefit has
been conferred.
In Williston on Contracts (3rd E d . ) , §1475, it is
recognized that the modern tendancy among courts is
to allow some recovery under certain circumstances,
even though the contractor has not substantially performed. Referring to the doctrine of substantial performance, the writer says:
But the courts have generally abandoned it,
and not hold that where a builder has supplied
work and labor for the erection or repair of a
house under lump sum contract, but has departed
from the terms of the contract, he is entitled to
recover for his services and materials, unless:
(1) The work that he has done has been of no
benefit to the owner;
(2) The work he has done is entirely different
from the work which he has contracted to do; or
(3) H e has abandoned the work and left it
unfinished.
In the instant case there was no proof that the
work was of any benefit of the owner. There was
proof that the work done was entirely different from
that which Exquisite contracted to do, and that Exquisite had left the work unfinished.
If Exquisite Home Builders is relying upon a
claim that they have conferred a benefit upon the property, they have the burden of proving the benefit. The
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question of the right to recover on the principle of restitution was considered at some length in Golob v. George
S. May International
Company, 2 W a s h . A p p . 499,
468 P.2d 707 (1970), in which the court said:
The alternate theory of restitution available
to an aggrieved party for a substantial breach
of contract permits recovery upon equitable
principles of payments made under the contract.
Restitution in such a case proceeds on the theory
of disaffirmance of the contract and when there
is no literal restitution, approximates the relief
of rescission, that is, being restored to one's original position as if no contract had been entered
into. If the defaulting party has partly performed and his breach is not willful and if the
part performance has enriched the aggrieved
party, the defaulting party may recover or setoff the monetary value of his part performance
against the aggrieved party's claim. This is so
because in equity and good conscience it would
be improper for the aggrieved p a r t y to retain the
benefits of the defaulting party's part performance without paying for it—the aggrieved party
otherwise would be unjustly enriched. If, however, the part performance is worthless or if the
fact of benefit or the monetary value of such
p a r t performance is not proved, there is neither
a showing of enrichment nor a showing that the
retention of benefits of such services is unjust.
The burden of showing unjust enrichment and
its value is upon the claimant defaulting party.
There is no evidence in this case that the performance by Exquisite H o m e Builders was a benefit to the
Quaglianas. The only thing upon which the court might
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have based such a finding of benefit is set out in findings numbers 39 and 40 (R. 21):
39. The plaintiffs sold Lot 8 to Gale G. Smith
on December 13, 1972, for the sum of $23,750.00; and that the said Gale G. Smith utilized the existing excavation and nearly all of the
existing foundation walls in the construction of
a home.
40. That plaintiffs purchased said Lot 8 on
May 4, 1971, for the sum of $20,485.00.
This finding is not sufficient to support a determination that the Quaglianas were benefited by the
performance of Exquisite Home Builders. There is no
evidence as to the negotiations or circumstances under
which the Quaglianas were able to obtain the lot for
the price they did, or the negotiations or circumstances
under which Gale G. Smith was willing to pay $23,750.00 for the lot. There was no testimony by anyone
that the value of the lot was increased by virtue of the
"improvements" placed upon it by Exquisite Home
Builders. The only evidence is that a purchase was
made on May 4, 1971, for one price and that the property was sold some 19 months later for a higher price.
There was no evidence as to the market value of the
property at either time, or as to the factors that may
have increased the price or as to whether the lot would
have brought a higher value with the foundation than
without it. Defendant Exquisite Home Builders has
thus failed in its burden of proving that the labor and
material furnished by it enhanced the value of the property or benefited the Quaglianas.
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Moreover, where a recovery is allowed for the
value of the benefit conferred, it is usually on the theory
that the circumstances must be such as to give an option
to the property owner to take or not to take the benefit
of the work done. As stated by the court in Sumpter
v. Hedges, 1 Q.B. 673 (1898) :
* * * Where, as in the case of work done on
land, the circumstances are such as to give the
defendant no option whether he will take the
benefit of the work or not, then one must look
to other facts than the mere taking of the benefit
of the work in order to ground the inference of
anew contract.
VI
The Quaglianas are entitled to recover the damages they suffered as a result of the breach of contract
by Exquisite Home Builders, together with a reasonable attorney's fee.
Inasmuch as the trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants, and held that the Quaglianas were the ones
guilty of the breach of contract, it made no finding
with respect to the damages suffered by the Quaglianas.
Robert Roof, a loan officer for Prudential Federal Savings, testified that the lending institution had
charged the Quaglianas a service fee at the inception
of $1,500.00; a credit report and appraisal fee of
$45.25; title insurance policy $235.00; and fire insur-
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ance $189.00, which were deducted from the loan proceeds.
Prudential Federal Savings charged interest in the
amount of $47.48. It made disbursements of $614.19
to Cook Lumber; $442.18 to A & L Concrete for footings; $498.92 to Exquisite Homes for permits and
footings; $396.00 for excavation; and $118.50 for staking the lot. In addition, the Quaglianas paid one $5.00
charge to Prudential for inspection fees. Of these
charges Prudential Federal Savings refunded $900.00
of the service charge and the $47.98 interest (R. 99100).
Dr. Quagliana had other expenses. H e had to hire
someone to remove weeds from the property, a cost of
$25.00; on another occasion in 1972 he had weeds removed at a cost of $60.00. H e paid Salt Lake County
taxes of $280.00 in 1972. H e incurred costs with the
Salt Lake Tribune of $59.68 in trying to sell the property. H e had a liability insurance policy which cost
$195.00, necessitated by the condition of the premises
as left by Exquisite Home Builders. H e paid K M
Design $500.00 and he paid $25.00 for copying blueprints; and $15.00 for posting signs on the property
in an attempt to sell it. His damages totaled $4,303.72,
or $4,803.72 if the K M judgment is not reversed.
The contract provided for a reasonable attorney's
efe for the prevailing party.
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Mr. R. Mont McDowell testified as to the method
of record keeping and expressed his opinion that a reasonable attorney's fee for time spent up until the trial
was $1,697.00, and $280.00 for each day of trial. There
were two trial days. In addition, other time was spent
in connection with motions for amendment of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and motion for a
new trial, indicating that the court should have allowed
an attorney's fee of not less than $2,257.00.
CONCLUSION
The Quaglianas, in an effort to have a home built
to their liking, relied upon the skill and competence of
two professionals, a designer and a contractor. Both
of them ignored the zoning ordinances and building restrictions and, as a consequence, the Quaglianas obtained the beginnings of a home they couldn't use.
Under the trial court's ruling, however, they had
to pay for the work even though it was not performed
in accordance with their contracts.
They behaved as reasonably as anyone could be
expected to behave under the circumstances, but reasonableness was not regarded by the trial court as a
virtue.
The trial court misconceived the law, the facts and
the issues, and entered judgment against the Quaglianas on legally unjustifiable grounds. The court
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found no breach of contract on the part of the contractor even though it located the home in contravention of building restrictions; it found no breach by the
designers even though they had as part of their contract approved a lot that wasn't suitable and had used
a 20-foot set back instead of the required 30-foot set
back.
The court held that the Quaglianas had breached
the contract even though their obligation had been discharged by defendants' prior breaches.
The judgment should be reversed and remanded
to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the
Quaglianas against Exquisite Home Builders in the
amount of $4,303.72, plus $2,257.00 attorney's fees, interest and costs (or determination of the amounts) and
dismissal of the counterclaims.

Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E . Roe
ROE AND F O W L E R
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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